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Abstract: Press conferences of different countries can be perceived
from a cross-cultural pragmatic perspective. This study investigated
evasion strategies employed by Chinese and American spokespersons
in the routine press conferences held by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of China and the US Department of State to sidestep
challenging questions from aggressive journalists on the issue of
North Korean Nuclear during the period of 4 months in 2006.
Evasion can be categorized into two types: overt evasion and
covert evasion. Findings demonstrated that: 1) Evasion strategy
was the frequently adopted strategy by both Chinese and American
spokespersons; 2) comparatively speaking, the American
spokesperson turns to overt evasion strategy more often while the
Chinese spokesperson adopts covert evasion strategy more frequently.
3) the differences of evasion strategies used by Chinese and American
spokespersons largely lie in their different verbal styles typical of
their respective national characteristics in protecting different national
interests.
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1. Introduction
The press conference, as an effective channel for governments to release
official information, is considered as a very important bridge of mutual
communication and cooperation with other countries, conducive to building a
good image of a country in a global arena. In the west, it is one of the key
research objectives in the fields of journalism, sociology and linguistics. It ’s
generally held that the regular press conference, which shares some similarities
with broadcast interviews or parliamentary debates, turns out to be more
professional and tactical than the presidential press conference. With regard to
the content, political language at the regular press conference, often in the form
of questions and answers, can be analyzed from any holistic perspective of the
social, social-historical, ideological, textual and other levels or layers (John Wilson,
1990).  The political press conference is an apparent context for the use of
evasive language, just as said, “Journalists are renowned for asking questions and
politicians are renowned for evading them” (Wilson 1990:131).
Evasion is the intended use of unclear messages, that is, vague, ambiguous,
or non-straightforward communication (Bavelas, Black, Chovil & Mullett, 1990;
Turner et al., 1975), frequently occurring in response to difficult or awkward
situations. It has become a burgeoning research topic in many disciplines like
broadcasting, language, diplomatic science, and it is also worthy of the further
research from a cross-cultural perspective. As culturally different countries, Chinese
and American spokespersons adopt their respective evasion strategies typical of
their national characters on press conferences to safeguard their respective interests
and realize their respective diplomatic objectives when facing questions from
aggressive journalists who are adept at soliciting implied information from political
figures. This study intends to unveil what specific evasion strategies are actually
utilized to deal with questions from professional journalists, and perceive culture-
bound reasons for the existence of different evasive answers and the high incidence
of certain evasive answers used by either Chinese spokespersons or their American
counterparts.
Regular press conferences are routine activities of official agencies. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China is responsible for holding Chinese regular
press conferences that disseminate information about foreign affairs and further
demonstrate the standpoints of foreign affairs taken by the Chinese official side
through answering questions posed by journalists. The U.S. Department of State
as a counterpart takes responsibilities of communicating diplomatic voices of
the American official side. These regular press conferences are held about twice
a week in China and three times a week in the U.S. with some uncertainties in the
virtual frequency due to the ever-changing international political atmosphere.
Among various internationally influential issues in the world from September to
December of 2006, the new development of the North Korean nuclear issue
can’t be emphasized more because of its significant nature and accordingly
worldwide shock waves of the event. This topic has become the focal issue for
analysis of this study.
This study takes an integrated approach in analyzing evasion strategy
employed spokespersons at press conference. Specifically it draws upon previous
literature on evasion theory in political interviews (Bull & Mayer, 1993; Galasinski,
2000) and cross-cultural pragmatic theory (Hall, 1977; Grice, 1975; Leech, 1983;
Brown & Levinson, 1987). The findings of comparative study should provide
information for a deeper exploration of different evasion strategies adopted by
Chinese and American spokespersons and a better understand of spokespersons’
discourse at press conference. They are thus conducive to the cross-cultural
communication in diplomatic field.
2. Evasion Strategy
The Definition of Evasion
The concept of evasion, although frequently referred to in the literature of
deception (Bradac, 1983; Bradac et al., 1986; Ng & Bradac, 1993), has until now
attracted lots of attention from researchers. There is little agreement as to what is
evasion in spite of much literature on evasion as a communication strategy (see
J. Bradac et al., 1986; Hopper & R. A. Bell, 1984; P. Gibbons et al., 1992; J. Wilson,
1990 and D. Galasinski, 2000).  However, the concept of evasion is often treated
without adequate conceptualization, and its analysis is full of conceptual pitfalls
because evasion connotes moral impropriety and hence a contestable perspective.
The definition becomes clearer when Orr and Burkins (1976) advise that evasion
has to do with equivocation and ambiguity (also Bull, 1994), and Harris (1991)
writes that a response is evasive if it doesn’t answer the question directly or
challenges the question. Evasion is relevant to the realm of question-answer
exchanges (Galasinski, 2000: 56), and evasion is defined in relation to a specific
theory of questions and answers” (Wilson, 1990:171).
Evasion has been sufficiently treated in the work of Bradac (1983), who
proposes that evasions are messages that the speaker believes will fail to inform
the addressee about a relevant belief A or will inform the addressee of matters
rather than A (also Bull & Mayer, 1993). Later, this concept has been amended.
Sik Hung Ng and James J. Bradac (1993) argue that evasive messages are those
intended as irrelevant and that can be interpreted unambiguously. The definition
of evasion given by Sik Hung Ng and Bradac introduces the idea of intention in
the description of evasion. Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish between irrelevances
in general and irrelevances that can count as evasions. An interlocutor who does
not realize that he or she is making an irrelevant remark (e.g., after failing to
understand a question) can’t be held responsible for evasion. Secondly, not all
intended irrelevances are counted as evasion. An irrelevant remark that is made
to make interlocutors laugh or to disrupt the conversation is not evasive, only
because there is nothing to evade. Galasinski (2000: 59) further argues, “Semantic
irrelevance is universal in acts of evasion.”
Based on the previous ground, we can summarize the characteristics of
evasion as follows: evasion is pertains the realm of question-answer exchange;
evasive utterances are semantically irrelevant to the questions to be responded;
the irrelevance is intentional; evasion can be categorized into two types: overt
evasion and covert evasion.
Overt evasion is much easier to identify, because the speaker more or less
will signal that he or she is not going to be cooperative through straightforward
oral refusals. However, in acts of covert evasion, the speaker attempts to conceal
that he or she doesn’t give a cooperative answer. The response is made by the
speaker to pretend that it answers the question, whereas actually it does not.
Therefore, covert evasion deserves special concern in political discourse.
There are various linguistic strategies for politicians or spokespersons to
adopt to evade journalist’ sharp questions. Among them, the functional approach
by Bull and Mayer (1993) and the semantic-structural approach by Galasinski
(2000) are most representative and they provide a comprehensive category of
evasion strategy for the present study.
The Functional Approach
Bull et al. devised a coding system for identifying various forms of evasion.
The so-called typology was based on eight interviews with Margaret Thatcher
and Neil Kinnock from 1987, and seven interviews with John Major from 1990/
1991 (Bull, 2003). Before the typology was constructed, criteria were firstly
established for identifying what made up questions, replies, non-replies and
intermediate replies (Bull, 1994). Questions were defined functionally as requests
for information, while replies as responses in which the information requested
could be obtained. The term “non-reply” was coined to mean those responses
in which the politician or spokesperson failed to provide any of the information
requested in the question. There were also some situations which, for different
reasons, fell somewhere between replies and non-replies; these were regarded as
“intermediate replies” (Bull, 2003: 101). These criteria were applied to conduct
an assessment of the extent to which politicians failed to answer the question.
Next was to investigate the various means in which politicians equivocated.
A typology of evasion was developed on the basis of responses in which
politicians failed to provide the information requested by interviewers. The results
of the 15 political interviews showed an overall reply rate of 46%, intermediate
replies 14% and non-reply rate 43% (Bull, 2003: 112). These results are similar to
those of a study by Harris (1991), who found out that politicians gave direct
answers to just over 39% of questions. From the perspective of functions of
replies, Bull (2003) identified 12 forms of evasion: 1) to ignore the question; 2)
to acknowledge the question without answering it; 3) to question the question;
4) to attack the question; 5) to attack the interviewer; 6) to decline to answer; 7)
to make political point; 8) to give incomplete reply; 9) to repeat answer to
previous questions; 10) to state or imply that the question has already been
answered; 11) to apology; 12) literalism. In using the evasion typology, it is
important to bear in mind that one response to a question can be coded in
terms of several forms of evasion.
Bull and Mayer’s typology, though enlightening and useful as a functional
approach, has some problems as to how the units within the typology may
interact with each other in evasion strategies. They didn’t pay much attention to
any of the work on the formal analysis of questions and answers. Indeed, Bull
and Mayer (1988: 4) comment, “there has been little if any systematic study of
question evasion in political interviews…we have no idea of the extent to which
this occurs, nor of how they manage to be evasive” (Wilson, 1990).
We also argue that the 12 forms have some overlaps, such as “to repeat
answer to previous questions” and “to state or imply that the question has
already been answered”. As a matter of fact, in real practice, each evasive answer
is not of such a particular type as suggested by Bull and Mayer. Sometimes there
is no clear-cut margin between one type and another, rather an answer is a
mixture of several types.
The Semantic-structural Approach
Galasinski (2000) exemplified three types of overt evasion –— to state
openly; to imply and to present oneself as the one who should not be asked the
question, and he further offered the typology of acts of covert evasion based
on the semantics of questions and answers. The speaker trying to evade the
question covertly gives an answer that manipulates the semantic content of the
question. The addressee, although pretending to answer the question, virtually
answers a different one. In other words, the speaker manipulates the focus of the
question (Galasinski, 2000: 61).
Galasinski (2000) identifies three types of covert evasion. The first type of
covert evasion is changing the textual context of the question, which consists in
the speaker/answerer’s reference to the focus. The speaker has several options
within this category. The speaker may speak of the issue in question yet say
things that are not warranted by the question’s content. The speaker can also
“reformulate the demand of the question” (Galasinski, 2000: 63). While maintaining
a close relationship between the question and the answer, the speaker may
broaden the scope of utterance. The second type of covert evasion involves the
speaker’s changing the focus of the question. It means that the focal argument,
which is changed, is talked about within the textual context demanded by the
question. The last type of covert evasion refers to change both the focus and the
textual context of the question. Also, there are a number of other strategies
which the speaker can adopt. The speaker can issue an utterance that includes a
proposition that is not coherently related to the question. This speaker may
address a proposition presupposed by the question. In this way, the speaker
covertly answers the question in a different perspective.
Cross-cultural Pragmatic Reasons behind Different Evasion Strategies
With high frequency of evasion in political interviews and press conferences,
people can’t help wondering why politicians or spokespersons equivocate. In the
eyes of the public, politicians or spokespersons are often depicted as evasive,
even deceptive: they are the sort of people who will not give a straight answer to
a straight question. What accounts for their failing to provide a straight answer
from the cross-cultural pragmatic perspective?
From the perspective of pragmatics, Grice’s cooperative principle, Leech’s
politeness principle and Brown & Levinson’s face theory are basic principles
guiding communication even when people employ evasion strategies. The
Cooperative Principle serves as an important criterion for identifying evasive use
of language as generating implicatures by overtly violation of a conversational
maxim. Another important reason that explains the existence of the intentional
use of equivocation is that people are attached to politeness. Therefore, being
evasive or indirect is a linguistic option chosen to comply with the Politeness
Principle and to achieve the goal of effective communication. Political
communication is rather complicated. There will be no cooperation or politeness
in the case of criticizing or ridiculing one’s opponents, but at regular press
conferences, it is common practice to maintain a certain degree of cooperation
and politeness. Resorting to the positive politeness principle, the spokesperson
takes the initiative to use evasion in stating his opinions, with respect to either
his own or his country’s face or the journalist’s face. By adopting the negative
politeness principle, the spokesperson’s evasive utterances are given out of
consideration for either party’s face. In this case, by giving an evasive answer, the
spokesperson is maintaining the minimum cooperation and politeness.
However, these principles are culture-specific, as has been approved by
researchers both home and abroad. Taking face theory as an example, the concept
of “negative face” in China is quite different from that in the west, and face in
Chinese has a much broader scope than face in English in that Chinese face
comprises lian and mianzi while English face only centers around certain aspects
of the Chinese notion face (Mao, 1994: 457). What constitutes a desirable face
may vary across cultures. Americans are less constrained by face concerns in
performing their actions than are Chinese, for whom face is likely to a consideration
of utmost importance. As Gao, Ting-Toomey and Gudykunst (1996: 289) put it,
“the notion of face permeates every aspect of interpersonal relationships in
Chinese culture because of the culture’s overarching relational orientation.”
Hall’s high-context and low-context cultural orientation can as well provide
a rationale of China’s implicit and indirect feature and America’s explicit and
direct characteristic of verbal communication at regular press conferences.
The anthropologist Edward Hall categorizes culture as being either high or
low-context orientated, depending on the extent to which meaning originates
from the settings or from the exchanged words. As Hall (1977) defined in his
Beyond Culture, “A high context (HC) communication or message is one in
which most of the information is already in the person, while very little is in the
coded, explicitly transmitted part of the message. A low context (LC)
communication is just the opposite; i.e., the mass of the information is vested in
the explicit code” (Samovar & Porter, 2004: 76). All cultures contain some
features of both high and low variables, and they can be placed along a high-
context and low-context dimension scale demonstrating their high or low ranking
(see Table 1).
Table 1:
Cultures Arranged Along the High-context and
Low-context Dimension
High-Context Cultures
Japanese
Chinese
Korean
Arab
Greek
 Spanish
 talian
English
 North American
Scandinavian
German
Low-Context Cultures
Based on the work of Edward T. Hall (Samovar & Porter, 2004: 77)
From Table 1, it is obviously seen that China is placed on the comparatively
high ranking just after Japan, while the U.S. on the opposite indicating a low-
context dimension only followed by Scandinavia and Germany. In high-context
culture, very little information is factually coded in the verbal communication;
hence, the most apparent characteristic of the Chinese mode of communication
(high context) is often vague, indirect and implicit, whereas in low-context culture
such as American, most of the information is contained in verbal messages;
hence, American communication (low context) is inclined to be direct and
explicit. We can see the major differences of cultural variations of high-context
and low-context cultures in the following Table 2:
High-context Culture
1)Implicitly embed meanings at
different levels of the soci-cultural
context
2)Value group sense
3)Tend to take time to cultivate and
establish a permanent personal
relationship
4)Emphasize spiral logic
5)Value indirect verbal interaction
and is more able to read nonverbal
expressions
6)Tend to use more “feelings” in
expressions
7)Tend to give simple, ambiguous,
non-contexting messages
Low-context Culture
1)Overtly display meanings through
direct communication forms
2)Value individualism
3)Tend to develop transitory
personal relationship
4)Emphasize linear logic
5)Value direct verbal interaction and
is less able to read nonverbal
expressions
6)Tend to use more “logic” to
present ideas
7)Tend to emphasize highly
structural messages, give details and
place great stress on words and
technical signs
Table 2: Contrasting High-context and
Low-context Cultural Variations
(Source: http://www.cba.uni.edu/buscomm/nonverbal/Culture.htm)
Table 2 shows a clear comparison of high-context culture and low-context
culture, and all of the above-mentioned differences can typically reflect the
primarily different characteristics of Chinese culture and American culture.
The present study
On the basis of the criteria of identifying questions, replies, non-replies
and intermediate replies mentioned earlier, we will typically probe into the
application of evasion strategy in non-replies and intermediate replies given by
spokespersons at regular press conferences. Due to the wide prevalence of evasion
phenomenon in political discourse, we assume that some common evasion
strategies adopted by spokespersons may exist at the regular press conferences
of both China and the U.S. Then, considering different cultural characteristics of
China and the U.S., spokespersons might resort to some different evasion strategies
at the regular press conference. Lastly, given the cross-cultural pragmatic reasons
behind various evasion strategies, comparisons are made to show why Chinese
and American spokespersons employ different evasion strategies to protect their
national interests. Therefore, I put forth the following three research questions
which the present study will typically address:
Question 1: What are the common evasion strategies Chinese and American spokespersons
employ at the regular press conferences?
Question 2: What are the differences of evasion strategies adopted by Chinese and
American spokespersons?
Question 3: What are the reasons for the existence of different evasion strategies employed
respectively by Chinese and American spokespersons?
3. Methodology
On the whole, both quantitative and qualitative analysis approaches are
adopted in the present study. By quantitative analysis, we mean that the research
is to provide some insights into the evasion strategy from the numerical analysis.
Meanwhile, it is necessary to investigate into actual instances of different evasion
strategies employed by Chinese and American spokespersons at the regular
press conference in order to explain the cross-cultural pragmatic reason, that is,
the qualitative analysis.
Data Collection
The actual data for this study are transcripts of regular press conferences
found on the official websites of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S.
Department of State. It is a fact that some questions posed at Chinese regular
press conferences are in Chinese, but the transcripts provided here are in the
English version provided by the official website of China’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
The issue of the North Korean nuclear crisis started in October, 2002,
when North Korean officials admitted the existence of a clandestine program to
enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons and declared the Agreed Framework
of 1994 nullified. Then North Korea took some proactive actions, such as restarting
Yongbyon nuclear reactor, disabling International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
surveillance devices at Yongbyon and expelling IAEA inspectors, to demonstrate
its defense of the sovereignty in face of the U.S. threat. After North Korea’s
withdrawing from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in
January 2003, tensions between the U.S. and North Korea ran higher and higher.
Against the backdrop, until the time when this study is conducted, five
rounds of six-party talks on the nuclear issue, involving North and South Korea,
China, Japan, Russia and the U.S., have been held accordingly from August, 2003
to December, 2006 in Beijing. In July 2006, the test-launch of several missiles
conducted by North Korea caught wide attention of the world. Three months
later, North Korea shocked the world again in a much more intense manner, that
is, its conducting of the underground nuclear test near P’unggye on October 9th,
2006. In response, the Security Council passed 1718 resolution which prevented
a range of goods from entering or leaving the DPRK and imposed an asset freeze
and travel ban on persons related to the nuclear-weapon program. Surrounded by
intense pressure, North Korea, in a surprising turnabout, agreed to return to stalled
six-party disarmament talks.
The above-mentioned brief introduction constitutes the political background
knowledge of the collected data for this study which cover a period of four
months starting from September 5th, 2006 to December 28th, 2006. During these
four months, the topic of the North Korean nuclear issue was frequently put
forward at regular press conferences of both China and the U.S., obviously becoming
a focal issue in the international political environment due to the extremely
shocking move that North Korea took on October 9th, 2006. This event not only
forced the U.S. to put the nuclear issue in the first place of its foreign affairs, but
also stirred up Northeast Asian security. There was a lot of new information
presented at each regular press conference, reflecting the fact that China and the
U.S. showed great concern about the new development of the North Korean
nuclear issue.
Since a regular press conference covers many topics that might be interesting
to journalists, the information on the North Korean nuclear issue is scattered
among other topics. We read through all the transcripts of every individual regular
press conference falling in the time period in order to collect useful data. The
following process is how we managed to collect appropriate data for this study.
We firstly ruled out those regular press conferences at which there was no questions
relevant to the North Korean issue brought up. The result is shown in Table 3:
Table 3: the Number of Regular Press Conferences after the Rule-out
It is shown from Table 3 that almost all the regular press conferences held
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China have mentioned the North Korean
nuclear issue except one regular press conference of September, and only 13 out
of 65 regular press conferences (80% of the total) held by the U.S. Department of
State haven’t touched upon this issue. This fact demonstrates that the North
Korean unclear issue is indeed the hot issue among the international political
topics concerning China and the U.S. during these four months.
Reading through all the transcripts of 31 regular press conferences of China
and 52 of the U.S., we then picked out question-answer sequences relevant to
this nuclear issue by typically searching some key words or phrases such as the
DRPK, the six-part talk, the nuclear test and the Korean peninsula. Those question-
answer sequences which didn’t contain such key words and were irrelevant to the
North Korean nuclear issue were ruled out. In this step, we noticed that there are
many multiple-turn interactional sequences centering around one focal argument,
and such sequences will be considered as the fundamental units for conversation
organization (Sacks, 1995). However, all question-answer sequences in transcripts
of Chinese regular press conference are standard single-turn interactions. The
number of units of analysis in the form of question and answer is presented in
Table 4:
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TN=Total Number of Regular Press
Conferences
AN=Actual Number of Regular Press
Conferences Mentioning the North
Korean Nuclear Issue
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Press Conferences of These Four
Months
Table 4: the Number of Units of Analysis
Based on the criteria of identifying replies and non-replies mentioned
earlier, attention will be focused on the answers to the questions. Those replies
to questions will be identified and then excluded out, and those remaining,
either in the form of non-replies or intermediate replies, will become the data for
further analysis of various evasion strategies. The distribution of replies and non-
replies (including intermediate replies) to questions are demonstrated in Table 5:
Table 5: the Distribution of Replies and
Non-replies (including intermediate replies)
On one hand, Table 5 shows that the U.S. spokespersons reply 100 questions
while their counterparts only 6 questions, so the reply rate of the U.S. (25.6%)
exceeds that of Chinaÿ1.6% ÿ by a large margin, which indicates that American
spokespersons are more straightforward than Chinese ones even faced with
politically challenging questions at regular press conferences. On the other hand,
these non-replies (including intermediate replies) to questions with 177 for
Chinese data, and 290 for the U.S.data constitute the data for the focus of the
analysis of the application of evasion strategies at regular press conferences.
Units of Analysis
In order to answer three research questions, the fitful data obtained need to
be analyzed quantitatively according to the typology of evasion strategies we
established by combining Bull and Mayer (1993) and the semantic-structural
approach by Galasinski (2000) as follows. We firstly identify two broad categories
of evasion strategies: overt practices and covert practices; and then each
broad category includes some sub-categories of evasion strategies. That is, to
decline to answer, to question the question, to state or imply that the
question has already been answered, to attack the question or the
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39
64
TN
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390
China
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M=Month C=Country TN=Total Number
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74
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52
169
China
1
44
US
25
52
China
4
35
US
14
50
China
6
177
US
100
290
September October November December TN
Replies
Non-replies
RT C
M
(1,6%) (25,6%)
(96,7%) (74,4%)
M=Month C=Country TN=Total Number RT=Reply Type
journalist and to apologize are included in the category of overt evasion;
and to make political positions, to ignore the question and to give
incomplete answers belong to the category of covert evasion. Before the
data is decoded, the eight sub-categories of evasion strategy have to be illustrated
by some samples for the purpose of precisely identifying these eight types of
evasion strategies. (J—journalist; CS – Chinese spokesperson; AS – American
spokesperson)
1 ) To decline to answer
  Six ways of declining to answer a question can be distinguished as
follows:
a. unwillingness to answer, e.g.:
J: U.S. Embassy statement said that the U.S. delegation shared ideas and the North
Koreans promised to study those ideas back in North Korea. Would those ideas include,
for example, allowing IAEA inspectors back into North Korea or like immediate suspension
of all activities?
AS: Again, they’d include a full range of ideas on how to make this round productive,
but I’m not going to go into any specifics on that . That’s for the negotiators and the
people involved in the discussions to work on. (U.S., 2006-11-29)
In this example, Mr. Casey declined to provide the specific answer as to
connotations of “ideas” by saying “not going to go into any specifics on that”.
Here, “not going to” reflects the unwillingness of Mr. Casey to answer the question.
b. refusals due to inability or lack of knowledge : admitting inability,
e.g.:
J: Does the U.S. have any independent intelligence that shows that in fact they’re getting
close to a test?
AS: David, I certainly can’t comment on any intelligence issues. We know that they
have made this statement that they intend to do this and that’s what our reaction is
based on here. (U.S., 2006-10-03)
In this example, Mr. Casey used the phrase “can’t comment on” to show
that he was unable to answer the question specifically as to whether any
independent intelligence showed North Korea was getting close a test.
c. not in the position to give some kind of information, e.g.:
J: Could China accept the US proposed draft resolution of the UN Security Council?
Does China support the condemnation of DPRK by the United Nations?
CS: I think it is necessary that the UN Security Council makes appropriate response to the
DPRK’s nuclear test. Now, the UN Security Council is conducting intense consultation on
the proposals. China is making thorough study of the issue with parties concerned. In
this context, I’m afraid I am not in the position to offer you more details. (China:
2006-10-12)
In this example, the Chinese spokesperson first presented the position of
China with regard to the DPRK’s nuclear test, but he didn’t continue to provide
any answer by evading that he was “not in the position to offer your more
details”.
d. deferred answer, not possible to answer the question for the time being,
e.g.:
J: Will China hold bilateral talks with any party to the Six-Party talks during the APEC
meeting?
CS: Please raise your question in the briefing later. (China, 2006-11-07)
In this example, the Chinese spokesperson wouldn’t like to make any comments
on this question by directly saying it was not the correct time to answer the question
for the time being. He deferred the answer to the question to the briefing.
e.  lack of new information at this point, e.g.:
J: Two things. One, the South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon told us last Friday at
UNGA that the United States was working — South Korea was working with the United
States on some kind of way to entice the North Koreans to come back to the table, and
he talked about looking for creative solutions. Can you give us any kind of a sense of
what those creative ideas or inducements might be?
AS: At this point I have nothing I can share with you. We’re talking with the
South Koreans as well as others about how to accomplish this. But fundamentally, it
comes down to the North Koreans making a strategic choice and trying to appeal to their
interests in making that choice and to talk about how to encourage them to make that
choice while remaining in — within the context of and the principles of the Six-Party Talks.
(U.S., 2006-09-27)
In this example, the American spokesperson declined to answer the yes-no
question by admitting the lack of new information at this point. Here, “I have
nothing I can share with you” is a typical sentence to demonstrate his refusal.
f. uncertain about the information but willing to check on it, e.g.:
J: So in other words, three-way and then two-way?
AS: Yeah, in theory, that’s the way — yeah, that’s the way that it worked today. He had a
meeting — I don’t know if he — I’ll check for you. I don’t know if he had a meeting
separately with the Chinese, but there was a meeting with the Chinese, the North Koreans
and the United States. Then there was a meeting with U.S. and North Korea. And then I
think the idea is that we’d replicate that tomorrow. (U.S., 2006-11-28)
In this example, the American spokesperson acknowledged that he didn’t
know this exact situation as to the three-way or two-way meeting, but he literally
expressed his willingness to check this situation for the journalist. Such ways of
declining to answer have high frequency in American data, reflecting American
people’s positive politeness strategy which will be elaborated later.
2) To attack the question or the journalist
The spokespersons attack or criticize the question or the journalist; and
several reasons for attacking the question can be identified:
a. The question is actually inaccurate, e.g.:
J: It is reported that when Hill visited Beijing shortly ago, he offered to hold bilateral talks with the
DPRK, only to be rejected by the DPRK. Please confirm. Why did the DPRK reject this proposal?
CS: The report you mentioned is inaccurate. China encourages and supports the US
and the DPRK in their direct contact, through which they can have an in-depth exchange
of views on their own concerns. We hope the US and the DPRK will show a flexible and
practical attitude, so as to find a proper solution. (China, 2006-09-14)
In this example, the Chinese spokesperson directly attacked the inaccuracy
of the question in the first sentence when giving his response.
b. The question is based on a false premise, e.g.:
J: Why did you decide to say yes? What made you change your mind about separate
discussions?
AS: Well, we didn’t change our mind about separate discussions. We have
done this in the past, as I pointed out, in July of 2005. And Secretary Rice talked about
this on her trip, so this is not out of our past pattern of behavior. I tried to draw a
distinction between discussions and negotiations. This was not a negotiation, but we
have from time to time found it useful to sit down with the North Koreans in a variety of
configurations. We have the New York channel. We have done this — we have had this
kind of meeting in the past. And it has on occasion proven useful. (U.S., 2006-10-31)
In this example, the American spokesperson straightforwardly attacked the
question by stating that the question was based on a false premise because the
fact that whether the U.S. changed its mind about separate discussions didn’t
stand.
c. The question is hypothetical or presumptive, e.g.:
J: Should any military conflict occur in the DPRK, what obligation does China have for the
DPRK?
CS: Your question is a presumptive question. (China, 2006-10-10)
In this example, the Chinese spokesperson directly attacked the question
due to the presumptive nature of the question.
d. The question includes some misused words or phrases, e.g.:
J: China is a neighbor and close ally of the DPRK, and is a nuclear weapon state. It is
assumed that China hoped the DPRK nuclear test to be a safe one.
CS: I don’t agree with your phrasing that China is an ally of the DPRK. China
adheres to the non-alliance policy, and does not enter into an alliance with any country.
China-DPRK relations are normal state-to-state relations based on the norms governing
international relations. (China, 2006-10-10)
In this example, the Chinese spokesperson stated that the word “ally” was
misused, so he didn’t agree with the journalist’s phrasing that China was an ally
of the DPRK. In this way, he attacked the question severely.
3) To question the question
The spokespersons ask for further information about the question. e.g.:
J: North Korea had (inaudible) is unwilling to talk between the United States and North
Korea. Does the United States agree with that?
AS: They want to hold talks?
J: Yeah, they ask you proposed to hold disarmament talks between U.S. and North Korea.
AS: Disarmament talks?
J: Yes. Nuclear disarmament.
AS: Aha. Well, first of all, we don’t consider, you know, although they have tested a
nuclear device we consider that a reversible state of being. Second of all, the United
States doesn’t have nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. We have said that before.
This is a backdoor way of trying to get the — have the international community recognize
North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, which we don’t. (U.S., 2006-12-19)
In this example, the American spokesperson questioned the question posed
by a journalist by continuously asking further information to confirm his
understanding or expressing his doubts. One feature of the way of questioning
the question is that it often occurs in multi-turn question-answer sequences, so
it’s no wonder that American data abound in such kinds of evasion strategy.
4) To state or imply that the question has already been answered, e.g.:
J: Weren’t some of those elements already embodied in the September 19th agreement which,
if they’re coming back on the basis of that, then presumably they’re accepting those terms.
AS: Well, as I’ve said before in answer to an earlier question, they haven’t walked
away from the September 19th framework agreement. And the agreement is, while a very
good agreement, it is a framework agreement. It does not flesh out specifically how to achieve
objectives and the commitments that are laid out in there. It’s a series of commitments in
essence on the part of the members of the six-party talks, and also a statement of objectives,
what are we trying to do in the six-party talk round. There are a lot of different things that can
be discussed in that context. We are focused on how to achieve the first of those objectives,
a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. (U.S., 2006-10-31)
 In this example, the American spokesperson stated that he had answered
this question before in the first sentence. The following statements made by him
were still beside the point, evading the question intrinsically.
5) To apologize, e.g.:
J: Since you read the commentary, the thrust of it is that sanctions are going to be
counterproductive, perhaps cause the North Koreans to test a weapon and that there’s
hardly any support in the region for them –
AS: Well, you know, look, as for support in the region, we’re now discussing with folks in the region
as well as elsewhere. But I always find it very interesting this argument that somehow it is the fault of
the United States or others when somebody else takes a step that is deeply provocative. So excuse
me if I don’t necessarily buy that argument that it is somehow — that somehow these
actions are somehow caused by the United States or the international community, when in fact it is
some of these other states like North Korea that happen to be the outliers in terms of their behavior.
So it’s, again, up to those states like North Korea to change their behavior.
The international community has spoken with one voice; in this case 15-0 on the Security Council
resolution. So it’s pretty clear where the modification in behavior is needed. (U.S., 2006-09-06)
In this example, the American spokesperson apologized for not buying the
argument that was provided by the journalist. In this way, he excused himself
from answering the question.
6) To make political positions, eg.:
J: Follow-up: The US hopes to see power changeover in the DPRK. Do you deem Kim
Jong-il a fit leader for that country?
CS: The Chinese government has consistently followed the policy of non-interference
in other country’s internal affairs. We maintain that the UN Charter, the international
law and the norms governing international relations should be abided by in handling
state-to-state relations. (China, 2006-10-10)
This example demonstrated that it was the common practice that the Chinese
spokesperson made political points or diplomatic policy clear by such phrases as
“to follow the policy of”, “maintain that” and “to make the position clear”.
7) To give incomplete answers
Several different forms of insufficient answers are distinguished.
a. minimal answer supported by some elaboration, e.g.:
J: The DPRK delegation to the Six-Party Talks said that the next round of the talks can not be held until
the DPRK and the US finished their financial dialogue. Does China concur with that? It is said that
the DPRK has expressed its willingness to make concession. It is ready to abandon the nuclear facility
in Nyongbyong if the US lifts the financial sanction. Can you confirm?
CS: Regarding the financial sanction, financial experts of the US and the DPRK have
communicated on this issue at this session of Six-Party Talks. Now, the two sides better
understand each other’s concern. We welcome and support their dialogue and consultation
in order to properly solve this issue at an early date.
The Joint Statement of September 19 clearly stipulated that the six parties should take coordinated
steps to implement the joint statement in a phased manner and in line with the principle of
“commitment for commitment, action for action”. They should endeavor for the goal of
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. We hope the parties concerned will bear in mind the
overall situation and do more to push forward the Six-Party Talks. (China, 2006-12-26)
In this example, the journalist asked the Chinese spokesperson about the
confirmation of the two-part question concerning the financial sanction issue,
but the spokesperson failed to provide a complete answer and only roughly
presented a minimal answer combined with its elaboration of China’s constant
position towards the settlement of the financial sanction issue.
b. insufficient answer which provides partial replies, e.g.:
J: What views are expounded during the close-door meeting by the heads of the
delegations? Will there be any progress out of today’s meeting?
CS: All parties expounded on their views on the implementation of the Joint Statement
and raised specific suggestions during the meeting of the heads of the delegations this
morning. (China, 2006-12-19)
In this example, the Chinese spokesperson merely answered the first part of
the question about the views expounded at the close-door meeting by all parties,
but didn’t provide any clue towards the second part of the question; hence, he
just gave insufficient answers.
8) To ignore the question
The spokespersons just ignore the question without attempting to answer it. e.g.:
J: Is the U.S. urging China to cut food and energy?
AS: Our focus now is on the sanctions resolution. (Inaudible) tied that to
getting back to the six-party talks. Our focus now is getting the Security Council
resolution and talking to UN member-states about how to enforce that Security Council
resolution. And certainly we’re also talking to them about the wider political security
situation in the region as well. So those are — that’s really the focus of our discussions
right now with them. (U.S., 2006-10-10)
In this example, the American spokesperson just ignored the question about
cutting food and energy but to focus on the sanction resolution. By means of shifting
the focal topic, the spokesperson achieved the goal of ignoring the question.
In the process of identifying the typology of eight sub-categories of evasion
strategy, it is important that one response to a question can be classified into
several categories. In this case, I, based on my own understanding and judgment,
will code this response into the most obvious strategy that the spokespersons
adopt. The following example can demonstrate this point, and the evasion strategies
are given in square brackets.
J: Will China’s banks prevent Chinese businessmen from remitting to the DPRK?
CS: Resolution 1718 of the UN Security Council has explicitly stipulated on the scope of
the financial sanctions against the DPRK. I suggest you read through that part.;ÿto give
incomplete answer-minimal answers supported by some elaboration=ÿAll countries should
fulfill their obligations in compliance with the Resolution.;ÿto make political positions=ÿ
You may consult with competent financial authorities of China about our normal financial
and business exchanges with the DPRK.;ÿto decline to answer—not in the position to give
some kind of information=ÿ (China, 2006-10-17)
In this example, three evasion strategies have been adopted by the Chinese spokesperson
to evade the question. In terms of the Resolution 1718 passed by the UN Security Council
on October 14th, 2006, China, as usual, is earnest and responsible to deal with relevant
issues in compliance with the Resolution, but China also holds some reserved opinions
about some parts of the Resolution, and China’s relevant financial authorities still haven’t
voiced their decrees. Thus, it is much better for the spokesperson to give insufficient answers
to equivocate the question. Therefore, I coded this response in terms of the most obvious
strategy—to give incomplete answers.
Coding of the Corpus
The quantitative analysis of two broad categories and eight sub-categories
of evasion strategy are conducted for both countries. The results will shed some
lights on and roughly answer the first two research questions.
Excluding the replies to questions, we have got the data of non-replies and
intermediate replies which fall into the target of our analyzing two broad categories
of evasion: overt evasion and covert evasion. For the convenience of analysis,
I come to the following integrated Table 6, which includes eight sub-categories
of evasion strategy:
Table 6: the Distribution of the
Typology of Evasion Strategy
China U.S.
DTA
AQJ
QTQ
SOI
TA
MPP
GIA
ITQ
Overt
Evasion
Covert
Evasion
Combinade number
Total number
Total number
C
DES
C=Country
D=Data
ES=Evasion Strategy
DTA=Decline to Answer
AQJ=Attack the Question or the
Journalist
QTQ=Question the Question
SOI=State or Imply That the Question
has Already Been Answered
Occurrence
27
10
1
3
1
42
47
78
10
135
177
% of CN
15.3%
5.6%
0.6%
1.7%
0.6%
23.7%
26.6%
44.1%
5.6%
76.3%
100%
Occurrence
157
22
15
17
1
212
1
65
12
78
290
% of CN
54.1%
7.6%
5.2%
5.9%
0.3%
73.1%
0.3%
22.4%
4.1%
26.9%
100%
As is shown from Table 6, both Chinese and American spokespersons turn
to evasion strategy when faced with political “avoidance-avoidance conflicts”.
In the part of data collection, I have collected 183 units of analysis for China
and 390 units for the U.S., and Chinese spokespersons equivocate 177 (96.7%)
of them, while American counterparts equivocate 290 (74.4%) of 390 units.
From the percentages, it is conspicuous that both sides choose to evade the
majority of questions posed by aggressive journalists at regular press conferences.
This fact upholds the common sense that political figures are frequently evasive
under questioning from members of the press given the adversarial feature of
contemporary journalism (Clayman, 2001). The violation of the Cooperation
Principle out of the consideration of the Politeness Principle as well as the
influence of the nature of politics on political language can explain the application
of common evasion strategies by both Chinese spokespersons and their American
counterparts at regular political press conferences.
It is clear from Table 7 that the common evasion strategies that both
Chinese and American spokespersons adopt at regular press conferences are
overt evasion consisting of declining to answer, attacking the question or the
journalist, questioning the question, stating or implying that the question has
already been answered, and apologizing; and covert evasion strategy made up
of making political positions, giving incomplete answers and ignoring the question.
The American spokesperson turns to overt evasion strategy more often than
his Chinese counterpart, which is evidenced by the data from Table 7—the percentage
of overt evasion with American coded data accounting for 73.1% of the total
number of answers selected for this paper, and the percentage of overt evasion
with Chinese coded data accounting for a mere 23.7% of the total number of
answers selected. On the contrary, the Chinese spokesperson adopts covert
evasion strategy more frequently than the American spokesperson, which is
proven by the following two percentages—the percentage of covert evasion with
Chinese coded data accounting for 76.3% of the total number of answers, and
the percentage with American data accounting for a tiny 26.9%.
Probing the depth of two broad categories, I come to the detailed differences
of evasion strategies employed by Chinese and American spokespersons. These
sub-categories of evasion strategies occur with different frequency in Chinese
and American coded data. As to the American typology of evasion strategies,
the strategy of declining to answer takes up 54.1% of the total number of
answers, and this percentage indicates that this evasion strategy occurs with the
highest occurrence. With regard to the Chinese typology of evasion strategy, the
strategy of giving incomplete answers constitutes 44.1% of the total number,
followed by the strategy of making political positions accounting for 26.6%.
Therefore, the main differences lie in the application of the strategy of declining
to answer on the U.S. side and the prevalent use of the strategy of giving incomplete
answers on the Chinese side. Furthermore, the strategies of making political
positions and ignoring the question are used more frequently by the Chinese
spokespersons than by their American counterparts; while the strategies of attacking
the question or the journalist, questioning the question, and stating or implying
that the question has already been answered in the U.S. data occur more often
than those in the Chinese data.
4. Discussions
To addressing research question three, although the Cooperative Principle
and the Politeness Principle can account for the existence of evasion in daily
communication, and are also applicable in political communication to some
extend, Hall’s high-context and low-context cultural orientation will be particularly
employed to elaborate the existent differences of various evasion strategies adopted
at Chinese and American regular press conferences. It must be noticed that
national interests always come prior to pragmatic reasons at such kind of political
occasions and therefore are taken into consideration in the following analysis..
The Reasons of China’s Covert Evasion Strategy
Chinese culture is characterized by a collectivist-based concept, which
encourages non-assertiveness in interpersonal communication. Harmonious in-
group interaction is the goal of communication. One obvious feature of Hall’s
high-context culture is its interdependence upon each other, emphasis upon
indirect verbal interaction, and inclination to give ambiguous and non-contexting
messages shown by Table 2. When the Chinese spokesperson imprinted with
such cultural characteristics speaks at regular press conferences, it is no wonder
that he or she might set the desired image of China’s diplomacy symbolizing the
creation of harmonious international environment in the first place to manifest
China’s constant diplomatic position in the world arena. With respect to the
North Korean nuclear issue, China is no exception in that China sticks to
safeguarding the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula, the resolution of
the North Korean nuclear issue through political and diplomatic means, and the
aim of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula. China’s position and attitudes
towards this issue are indicative of its constantly held view that China is an
unswerving strength to safeguard the world peace and create a harmonious world,
let alone the security of Northeast Asia that matters a lot to China’s interests.
Besides, Chinese culture is renowned for its implicit and face-oriented way
of communication. As Brown and Levinson (1987) said, refusals are a kind of
face-threatening act, and implicitness or indirectness assists in mitigating the
possible damage caused by direct confrontations. In answering questions
concerning the complicated North Korean nuclear issue, the Chinese spokesperson’s
avoiding direct refusals or just giving insufficient answers at sensitive juncture,
except the consideration of political and diplomatic interests, is also rooted in
maintaining the “face” of his or her public image from the cultural perspective.
Acknowledging lack of knowledge or uncertainty about information which
spokespersons are assumed to know is also face-threatening to Chinese
spokespersons. The consideration of his or her “face” results in the scarcity of
the strategy of directly declining to answer. Consequently, such ways of directly
declining to answer as “unwillingness to answer”, “not in the position to give
certain kind of information”, “uncertain about the information but willing to
check on it” have much fewer occurrences in Chinese data. Considering the
difficulty in admitting their “shortcomings”, Chinese spokespersons often resort
to covert evasion strategies such as giving incomplete answers in the form of
minimal answer supported by some elaboration and insufficient answers by
giving partial replies.
Moreover, the Chinese spokesperson representative of the Chinese official
diplomatic image has to uphold the “face” of the government, the Chinese
people and even the country, so he or she wants to be respected, and their
utterances to be appreciated and justified. China, which has been exerting great
influences upon North Korea in terms of politics, military, economy and culture,
has great leverage over North Korea with respect to the nuclear disarmament and
need its “face” to be enhanced and diplomatic points respected by North Korea.
Hence, in this case, it is wise for the spokesperson to resort to covert evasion
either by making political points, stating political positions or by giving incomplete
replies to spare the journalist’s feelings, especially when faced with hard and
tough questions. Therefore, for Chinese spokespersons, it is necessary for them
to preserve their own face, the face of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the face of
Chinese government and the face of China to leave enough room for maneuver
at regular press conferences.
To better understand the above-mentioned reasons behind the covert evasion
strategy employed by Chinese spokespersons, the following chosen examples
from coded Chinese data will be used to elaborate these reasons:
1) Q: Do you think the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapon will make Northeast Asia
more dangerous? What’s the source of the danger and who should be blamed?
CS: Since the DPRK conducted a nuclear test, the tension is aggravated in Northeast
Asia and on the Korean Peninsula. In such circumstances, we think all parties should
respond in a calm way. Meanwhile, we require the DPRK to honor its commitment to
denuclearization, stop any action that may worsen the situation and come back to the
track of the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible. As for the nuclear issue on the Peninsula
itself, we deemed it a painstaking and complicated issue from the very beginning. To
solve this issue demands the joint efforts of all parties concerned, in particular the
principal parties. In the current context, all parties should observe the important consensus
reached by the six parties on last September 19, resume the Talks and honor their
common commitment in the Joint Statement, so as to realize the lasting peace and stability
on the Korean Peninsula. (China, 2006-10-10)
In example 1), it is clearly seen that the journalist asks two questions in
one time, one being a yes-no question which needs a positive or negative
confirmation, the other being an interrogative question which asks for the
specification of kind and which persons. However, no direct answers can be
found in the according response. The Chinese spokesperson just gives incomplete
answers to the first question by only making the political position of China
towards the North Korean nuclear issue, and completely ignores the second
question. Probing the depth of these two questions, we can find why the Chinese
spokesperson fails to provide the journalist with clear and direct information.
The spokesperson uses the phrase “tension aggravated” instead of answering
directly that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons will make northeast
Asia more dangerous, because the meaning of the vague phrase “tension
aggravated” is more general and abstract, and less subjective than the descriptive
word “more dangerous”. The underground nuclear test conducted by the DRPK
indeed made the security situation of northeast Asia more unstable, but China,
as the only nuclear state in this area, should be prudent with its choice of words
for the sake of security. Meanwhile, the phrase “tension aggravated” by the
Chinese spokesperson just coincides with the utterances of “aggravate tensions
in northeast Asia” given by White House Press Secretary Tony Snow. At this
sensitive juncture, it ’s not mature to show its subjective attitudes towards this
shocking event so early. Therefore, China’s making political positions would be a
safe choice for such diplomatic policy positioning of China’s independent foreign
policy of peace is well-known in the international community. It is no harm to
repeat this position in front of the press at the sensitive time. On one hand, such
acts will strengthen China’s image as a peace-maintainer and six-party talk supporter.
On the other hand, such lengthy policy presentation of China shows that the
spokesperson takes the initiative to equivocate the question by so-called positive
politeness strategy.
The second question is more detailed and challenging, and should be
handled with special attention. As a responsibly big country in the word, and a
permanent member of the Security Council, the Chinese spokesperson’s answering
such a specific question must be supported by solid evidence, let alone the
impossibility to judge so sensitive event at so sensitive time. Out of the
consideration of the responsible image China has always cultivated in the
international community and as a stern upholder of creating a harmonious
world, it’s wise for the spokesperson to protect the “face” of the country by
ignoring the challenging question.
2) Q: Will China continue to implement the sanction resolution against the DPRK adopted
by the UN Security Council since the DPRK has agreed to come back to the Six Party Talks?
What measures should the DPRK take to lift the sanctions?
CS: Now the biggest concern to the six parties and the international community is how
to push forward the Six Party Talks and gain positive progress. With respect to the
impact of the Six Party Talks on the implementation of Resolution 1718 adopted by the
UN Security Council, it is not an issue to be decided by the Talks. (China, 2006-11-02)
In example 2), the journalist puts forward a double-barrelled question
(including two sub-questions) to the Chinese spokesperson; and from the response
given by the spokesperson, no direct response can be found. The spokesperson
turns to the strategy of covert evasion while giving some background information
that can be regarded as partial replies. The spokesperson diverges from the
sanction problem first but sticks to the six-party talk issue, and furthermore, the
subtle form of covert evasion is embodied in the response of “with respect to the
impact of the Six Party Talks on the implementation of Resolution 1718 adopted
by the UN Security Council” that the spokesperson makes some operation on.
When the spokesperson is asked whether China will continue to implement the
sanction against the DPRK adopted by the Security Council, the spokesperson
makes an agenda-shift, talking about the impact of the six-party talks on the
implementation of Resolution 1718, and this slightly changes the topic of the
question. The Chinese spokesperson’s caution is not difficult to understand: any
confirmation would presumably demonstrate that China has totally supported
the sanction against the DPRK adopted by the Security Council, but actually
China and the U.S. have some differences about how to enforce the U.N. sanction
that they voted to impose on the DPRK on Oct.14, 2006, and China said it
would not interdict North Korean cargo ships at sea as the U.S. and Japan have
recommended. Under such circumstances, a direct answer may be unsupportable
and may even contradict with what China has insisted on with regard to the
sanction issue. The spokesperson manages to answer the question in a rather
subtle way, and even makes a slight agenda-shift . He presents himself as if he
were dutifully responsive, but he winds up giving a answer that is not the requested
information which the journalist wants to seek. Moreover, the spokesperson
never gets around to the second part of the question, regarding what measures
the DPRK should take to lift the sanction. It’s obvious that the specific measures
taken by the DPRK are hard to present by the Chinese official side, and are even
too early to be summarized by the Chinese spokesperson. For the sake of
maintaining the desired “face” of China, the covert evasion of ignoring this part
of the question would be feasible.
The Reasons of the U.S.’s Overt Evasion Strategy
Individualism is phenomenal in the American culture. It lies at the core of
the English world’s social ideology. Its most direct reflection in real life is
individuals’ assertive behavior in normal social interactions. One fundamental
assumption of assertiveness is that individuals are more likely to establish the
atmosphere of cooperation rather than confrontation by respecting the rights,
needs and priorities of others. In communicating with assertive people, in Hulbert’s
words, “One usually knows where they stand; they say what is on their minds
rather than beat around the bush” (Hulbert, 1982: 75). However, Hulbert continues,
assertiveness doesn’t mean one can do or say anything to anyone under the
guise of “openness” or “honesty”; mature and assertive people should take the
responsibility of one’s actions. If the assertive people have rights, so do others,
and this is to be responsibly assertive. Due to this, we can find that at American
regular press conferences spokespersons treat those journalists very casually and
intimately by calling their name directly; and some expressions like “laugh” in
the coded American data as well appear.
Besides, in a typical low-context culture, the American people would like
to overtly display meanings through direct communication forms, value direct
verbal interaction and tend to emphasize highly structured messages and give
details demonstrated by Table 2. When the American spokespersons characterized
by such cultural traits are faced with challenging questions and aggressive journalists,
they can still, to a great extent, be frank and direct in face-to face confrontation.
As illustrated in Literature Review, the face concern and politeness strategy
are universal in all cultures. However, it is a fact that there are cultural differences
of politeness which exactly reflect different cultural values in various countries.
The Chinese people place stress on maintaining or preserving the positive face,
while Americans focus on the preservation of the negative face. The protection
of the negative face of journalists will surely leave more independent and free
room for them to ask back, which explains the frequent occurrence of multi
question-answer sequences in the American coded data. The face concern in
America is based on the concept of equality, so the American spokesperson will
talk in a frank, direct and honest way and even openly admit their inability or
lack of knowledge about relevant information. Therefore, such phrases as “can’t
comment” “don’t want to predict” “not going to” “not aware of” and “would like
to check on” usually occur when American spokespersons overtly decline to
answer questions. Further, the American spokesperson chooses to attack the
question or the journalist, question the question for further information and state
or imply that the question has been answered more often than his Chinese
counterpart in direct confrontations. Adopting these overt evasion strategies, the
American spokesperson can facilitate the effective communication and take
steps to minimize the damage that covert evasion otherwise cause. Some examples
will be provided here to indicate how overt evasion strategies are employed by
the American spokesperson to achieve the goal of effective verbal communication.
3) Q: We are talking about the North Korean and Iran. Are you seeing similarity between
these two countries? Because usually they’re coming at the same time, they’re in the
middle — in July North Korea regarding the missiles of North Korea launching missile,
and at the same time Iran supposed to go the Security Council. Right now Iran supposed
to go to Security Council and North Korea coming with a nuclear test. Are you seeing
any similarity between these two countries or maybe some kind of cooperation?
AS: Well, in terms of what coordination or cooperation they have between them, I’d
leave it to officials in both those countries to talk to. In terms of our view of
the issue, obviously they are unique and distinct problems. We are treating them as we
see fit for each individual issue. We, though, are committed in both instances to trying to
find a diplomatic resolution to these crises and do so in a way that frankly serves not
only the interests of the United States and the broader international community but the
people of those countries themselves. (U.S., 2006-10-05)
In example 3), the American deputy spokesperson of State Department is
posed by a challenging question concerning about the similarity between the
DPRK and Iran which are both considered as “axis of evil” countries by the U.S.
From the response, Mr. Casey directly refers the question to who are supposed to
provide answers—officials of both countries; this brief and overt answer is
reasonable and smart . For one thing, realistically, the U.S. can’t know whether
such coordination or cooperation exist between the DPRK and Iran, so to answer
the question would be inappropriate and can be taken to imply that the question
soliciting this answer is inappropriate; the refusal to answer is compliant with
factual reasoning. For another thing, though trouble-makers and “axes of evil” the
two countries are, the U.S. smartly shifts the responsibility of showing its subjective
attitudes. Such overt decline to answer by alleging not in the position to provide
information minimizes the damage that direct answer might cause. Then Mr.
Casey further states the view of the U.S. which can varnish the alleged diplomatic
image of the U.S. in the international community.
4) Q: One more thing. Last week Assistant Secretary Hill said that the U.S. and its allies would
not live with a nuclear North Korea. I mean today aren’t we — although you’re taking steps to
adjust the program, I mean, isn’t North Korea in fact a nuclear state right now?
AS: Well, they have — our estimates, for some time, and you can go back and looking at the
intelligence estimates even prior to this Administration were that they at least had the capability
to produce nuclear weapons and that likely, in fact, possessed some number of them. They
actually — the exact numbers on the estimates varied — they varied over time.
We have made it clear that this is an unacceptable state of being. It is a
destabilizing situation in which you would have a nuclear-armed North Korea and that
is not something that is in dispute. That is something — an opinion that is shared by not only
the people in the neighborhood, but also people worldwide. (U.S., 2006-10-10)
In example 4), the American spokesperson is faced with the question
whether the DPRK is in fact a nuclear state. The U.S. is opposed to admitting the
DPRK’s being a nuclear state; hence the spokesperson must evade this question
by indirectly stating that “this is an unacceptable state of being” and carefully
choosing the phrase “a nuclear-armed North Korea”. This overt evasion strategy
of implying that the question has been made clear not only indicates the position
of the U.S. towards the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons that the U.S. will
never allow the DPRK to return to the six-party talks as a nuclear state, but also
helps to ensure that the refusal will not be taken as an act of defiance against the
journalist per se.
5) Q: Are the ’05 financial sanctions against North Korea still a sticking point?
AS: You mean the Banco Delta Asia measures?
Q: Yes.
AS: Well, again, as we have said previously, we know this is something that’s of
concern to the North Koreans and we’ve talked about establishing a working group in
which, you know, we would be able to discuss those issues in the context of the six-party
talks. But you know, I assume that’s still a valid issue and concern of theirs and, again, we
have a proposal in terms of how we would be able to address those. (U.S., 2006-11-29)
Example 5) shows that the multi-turns of question and answer is a typical
way of overt evasion in the form of questioning the question by asking for
further information about the question. Here, the spokesperson requests for the
clarification of 2005 financial sanction against North Korea, and then he implies
that the U.S. has made the position of the BDA (Banco Delta Asia) issue clear
that should be discussed within the context of the six-party talks. The allowing of
multi-turns of question and answer signifies that the American spokesperson
dares not the direct confrontation. If the spokesperson should covertly evade the
question, he would not provide a clarification question for the journalist to
attack, but would make full use of the vague indication to give a rough idea or
make rough political points.
Until now, the three research questions are addressed one by one. The first
two research questions are supported by quantitative analysis to arrive at the
exact percentage of each evasion strategies adopted by respective spokespersons
of China and the U.S. from respective coded data, and the third research question
is addressed by combing theoretical insights with some sample units of analysis.
5. Conclusions
Summary
The present study is primarily an attempt at analyzing and interpreting the
evasion strategy applied at Chinese and American press conferences from the
cross-cultural pragmatic perspective with special reference to the North Korean
nuclear issue.
To answer the three research questions, the Chinese and American coded
data are both collected from respective official websites, and finally obtained
through step-by-step data filtering. With the data, we penetrate into the application
of evasion strategy in non-replies and intermediate replies according to the
criteria proposed by Quirk et al. (1995) and Jucker (1986).
Assisted by the quantitative analysis and sample illustrations, we obtain
the following main points. Firstly, given the adversarial character of contemporary
journalism, the impetus to resist some questions is common phenomena. Some
common evasion strategies are adopted by both Chinese and American
spokespersons, such as overt evasion strategies including declining to answer,
attacking the question or the journalist, questioning the question, stating or
implying that the question has already been answered and apologizing, and
covert evasion strategies including making political positions or points, giving
incomplete replies and ignoring the question. Secondly, by investigating and
comparing the percentages of each type and sub-type of evasion strategies among
the total number obtained, some differences of evasion strategies employed by
Chinese and American spokespersons are distinguished. For example, American
spokespersons resort to overt evasion at most of the time while Chinese
counterparts mostly rely on covert evasion to avoid direct confrontation. Thirdly,
the differences of respective evasion strategies used by Chinese and American
spokespersons largely lie in their different verbal styles in protecting different
national interests. Hall’s high-context and low-context cultural orientation can
provide a rationale of China’s implicit and indirect feature and America’s explicit
and direct characteristic of verbal communication at regular press conferences.
Implicat ions
The present study has a number of important insights. First and foremost,
this study conducts a trying theoretical probe that combines some points of the
functional approach with those of the semantic-structural approach to construct
an integrated typology of evasion strategy. This typology offers a comprehensive
account of various evasion strategies adopted by Chinese and American
spokespersons.
Besides a trying theoretical probe, the results are also beneficial for the
audience to better capture key points of spokespersons’ statements, and further
understand intended motives of official political discourses. Not limited to the
diplomatic field, the audience can better understand the essence of how evasion
can be employed in daily communications to cultivate their communication
skills. Moreover, as communicators of the official voice and general audience,
journalists will find the analysis and comparison helpful for them to be more
aware of different evasion answers at the press conference, and further to put
forward more effective questions or follow up with more close-to-point questions
thrown to spokespersons. Furthermore, the insights drawn from the comparison
would be relevant to interpreters, political analysts, and those involved in diplomatic
analysis to better play their due roles in their professions
Limitations
Some limitations must be pointed out in this study. One of the main
limitations of the study concerns its coded data and their collection process.
The use of readily made transcripts from official websites is not enough, and if
some audio or video versions of the materials can back up the written transcripts,
the whole analysis process will be more solid. In addition, the use of English
translation version of Chinese coded data needs to be thought twice. Regarding
the collected data of four months, they are quite limited. More data can be
collected to conduct more detailed and persuasive analyses. What’s more, the
process of data collection involves some subjective elements.
Though the evasion strategy is typically dealt with in the field of political
language in this study, some other politically related elements such as ideological
analysis are as well exerting great influences upon spokespersons’ choice of
political language. Political language goes beyond the simple verbal evasion, and
the influence of other ideological consideration can’t be ignored. Therefore, for
further research, it would be interesting to incorporate theories of critical discourse
analysis and ideological studies into the present cross-cultural pragmatic study.
Studies of these kinds will shed some lights on a profound contrast in two
starkly different countries and cultures of different ideologies, and illustrate how
political language at press conferences functions as carriers of information and
ideology.
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